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Case No. 20090854-CA 
IN THE 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
State of Utah, 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Lucia Arnold & Vanessa Arnold, 
Defendants/ Appellants. 
Brief of Appellee 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Defendants appeal their convictions for third degree felony retail theft. This 
Court has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated § 78A-4-103(2)(3) (West 2009). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
Defendants were charged with retail theft. At the preliminary hearing, they 
claimed that several department store employees and Provo City police officers 
framed them, and that this conspiracy was motivated by a lawsuit one of the 
Defendants had filed several years earlier against Skip Curtis, a Deputy Utah 
County Sheriff. Before trial, the trial court barred the Defendants from testifying 
about the Curtis lawsuit. 
Issue: Was Defendants' trial counsel constitutionally ineffective for not 
arguing at trial that the State had opened the door for testimony about the Curtis 
lawsuit, where raising this claim would have allowed the State to prove that the 
Defendants were lying about one of their central claims? 
Standard of Review: "An ineffective assistance of counsel claim raised for the 
first time on appeal presents a question of law." State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, % 6,89 
P.3d 162. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, or rules. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendants were charged with retail theft. R. 346 at 6-7; R. 347 at 5-6.' A jury 
convicted both Defendants. R. 346 at 156; R. 347 at 155. 
1
 This is a consolidated appeal from cases 081401346 and 081401347. The 
Defendants were tried together below. When necessary to distinguish the two 
cases, the State will cite to the records as R. 346 at and R. 347 at . To avoid 
redundancy, the State will cite to the transcripts as R. 255: (preliminary hearing), 
244: (trial, day 1), and 243: (trial, day 2). 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS* 
Lucia and Vanessa Arnold are caught with $1049 
worth of concealed clothing 
On May 7, 2008, Scott McDermeit was working as the security camera 
operator at the Dillard's department store in Provo when he noticed Lucia and 
Vanessa Arnold. R. 244: 99-100. McDermeit recognized the two women from an 
incident earlier that week when he had observed them acting suspiciously. R. 244: 
101. McDermeit noticed that Lucia and Vanessa were gathering a large number of 
items, and that each was carrying a large shopping bag from another store. R. 244: 
101. 
At 7:54 p.m., Lucia and Vanessa entered a dressing room with about 15 items 
each. R. 244: 101, 103; State's Exh. 1 at 7:54:44.3 About 20 minutes later, Lucia 
emerged from the dressing room, empty-handed. See R. 244:103; State's Exh. 1 at 7: 
54: 44 to 8: 14: 44. Lucia then "grabbed some more items and went back into the 
dressing room/7 R. 244:103. Lucia repeated this pattern "two or three" more times. 
R. 244:103; see also State's Exh. 1 at 8:31:35, 8:35:40, 8:36:58, 8:38:14. 
2
 The "evidence and all reasonable inferences which may reasonably be 
drawn from it" are recited "in a light most favorable to the verdict." State v. 
Hamilton, 827 P.2d 232, 236 (Utah 1992) (quotations and citation omitted). 
State's Exhibit 1 is a DVD of the security camera footage that was introduced 
at trial. It is contained in a manila exhibits folder in the record. 
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McDermeit thought this suspicious, so he alerted Chris Hendricksen, an off-
duty police officer who worked part-time at Dillard's as a store security officer. R. 
244: 105. He also alerted several store employees, who began watching Lucia's 
behavior. R. 244:105. 
At 8:40, both Lucia and Vanessa emerged from the dressing rooms. State's 
Exh. 1 at 8:40:01. Vanessa had not left the dressing room a single time during the 
intervening 46 minutes. R. 244:125,135; State's Exh. 1 at 7:54:44 to 8:40:01. After 
Lucia put a few items on the rack, the two women began walking towards an exit 
carrying nothing but the shopping bags they had brought into the store. State's Exh. 
1 at 8:40:53. 
McDermeit focused the security camera on the bags and saw that they were 
noticeably heavier than when Lucia and Vanessa had first entered the dressing 
rooms. R. 244:105; compare State's Exh. 1 at 7:48: 23 with id. at 8:40:37. While the 
bags had appeared light before, their draw strings were now taut, and the women 
were "having trouble picking them up." R. 244: 105-06, 167. McDermeit 
immediately dispatched an employee to the dressing room to see if the women had 
left any of the clothing behind. R. 244:106. They had not. R. 244:106. 
McDermeit alerted Hendrickson about the possible theft. R. 244:105. He also 
contacted the Provo City police and asked them to send an officer. R. 244:127. 
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Still carrying their bags, Lucia and Vanessa walked toward a store exit. R. 
244: 106-07. As they passed the doors, Hendricksen approached the women, 
identified himself as a store security officer, and asked them to accompany him to a 
manager's office. R. 244: 167. Hendricksen was with Arloha Sutherland, a store 
manager, who was asked to accompany Hendricksen because the two suspects were 
females. R. 244:167,198-200. 
Hendricksen and Sutherland escorted the two women to an office. At that 
point, Lucia and Vanessa started speaking Spanish to each other. R. 244:167. When 
Hendricksen tried to talk to them in English, the two claimed to be unable to 
communicate in English. R. 244:171,201. This seemed odd, given that Sutherland 
had spoken to Vanessa in English earlier that evening. R. 244:199. 
Hendricksen then picked up one of the bags that Lucia and Vanessa had 
carried into the store. R. 244:168. The bag was from Foot Locker and had a shoe 
box inside with a string tied around it. R. 244:168. Hendricksen thought that the 
bag was "a lot heavier than a pair of shoes would be." R. 244:168. Hendricksen cut 
the string, opened the box, and found a number of clothing items inside, " tightly 
folded up and rolled up/ ' R. 244:168; see also R. 244:201. He then looked inside the 
other bags and found similar stacks of clothing inside, all tightly rolled inside shoe 
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boxes. R. 244:168, 201. When Hendricksen and Sutherland later inventoried the 
items concealed in the bags, the total value was $1049. R. 244: 208. 
Officer Douglas Straddling of the Provo Police Department arrived. R. 243: 
231,236. Straddling did not speak Spanish, and he was concerned that Defendants' 
continued conversations in Spanish would allow them to coordinate their stories. R. 
243: 236. After unsuccessfully trying to get them to stop speaking to each other, 
Straddling decided to move Vanessa to an adjoining room. R. 243: 237-38. When 
Vanessa physically resisted, he placed her in handcuffs. 244:174-75,209-10. At that 
point, Lucia stood up and, in "perfect English/' yelled: "Get your f-ing hand off my 
daughter. I want to talk to my attorney/' R. 244:175; see also R. 244: 211. 
Officer Straddling found a pair of car keys while searching Vanessa. R. 243: 
241. Officer Brad Partridge from the Provo City Police Department then located 
Vanessa's car in the parking lot. R. 243: 261, 264-65. Looking inside, Partridge, 
Straddling, and Hendricksen all saw a stack of tightly rolled-up department store 
clothing on the back seat. R. 243: 243, 265; 244:178. Lucia and Vanessa were both 
subsequently charged with retail theft. R. 346 at 6-7; R. 347 at 5-6. 
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The trial court denies Defendants7 request to testify about a lawsuit that 
Vanessa had filed against a Utah County Sheriff's Deputy 
several years earlier 
Hendricksen and Straddling testified in behalf of the State at the preliminary 
hearing. R. 255: 6-45 (Hendricksen), 45-76 (Straddling). On cross-examination, 
defense counsel repeatedly suggested that the officers had framed Lucia and 
Vanessa. R. 255: 21-43, 53-76. Defense counsel's cross-examination further 
suggested that the officers were motivated by a lawsuit that Vanessa had filed 
several years earlier against Skip Curtis, a deputy sheriff with the Utah County 
Sheriffs Office. R. 255: 21-22, 70-76. As part of this claim, defense counsel alleged 
that when Officer Straddling transported Vanessa to the jail for booking, he stopped 
the car along the way, at which point Curtis had opened the door, put a gun to 
Vanessa's head, and threatened to kill her if she did not drop her suit. R. 255: 70-76. 
After Defendants were bound over, the State filed a motion to prevent them 
from testifying about the Skip Curtis suit and Curtis' alleged involvement in this 
case. R. 346 at 120-29; R. 347 at 120-28. In that motion, the State proffered that 
Vanessa had sued Deputy Curtis several years earlier, that she had lost the case at 
trial, and that her appeal was pending. R. 346 at 128. The State then stressed that 
there was no evidence that Deputy Curtis or even the Utah County Sheriffs Office 
was involved in this investigation. It accordingly argued that Defendants' 
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speculative claims should be barred under rules 402 and 403, Utah Rules of 
Evidence. R. 346 at 122-28. 
Judge Gary Stott heard arguments on the motion before trial. R. 244: 3-12. 
During argument, the State further proferred that it had passport stamps, airline 
tickets, and photographs showing that Skip Curtis was actually in Amman, Jordan, 
on the day of this incident, and that he therefore could not have threatened Vanessa 
alongside the road in Orem as she was claiming. R. 244: 8. 
The trial court granted the State's motion, ordering that the parties could not 
refer to Vanessa's suit against Skip Curtis or attempt to implicate him in the alleged 
conspiracy. R. 244:10-14. 
Trial 
At trial, the State presented testimony from McDermeit, Hendricksen, 
Sutherland, Officer Straddling, and Officer Partridge, all of whom testified about the 
Defendants7 incriminating behavior. See R. 243: 231-65; 244: 94-220. The State also 
introduced footage from the security cameras as an exhibit. See State's Exh. 1. As 
discussed above, that footage showed Lucia and Vanessa walking into the dressing 
rooms with their arms full of clothes, Lucia repeatedly emerging to get more clothes, 
and the two Defendants leaving the dressing room 46 minutes later carrying two 
heavy shopping bags from other stores. See generally State's Exh. 1 at 7:47 to 8:40. 
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Defendants testified in their case-in-chief. Lucia and Vanessa both testified 
that they never placed any clothing inside their shopping bags and that the evidence 
against them had been fabricated. See generally R. 243: 281-316 (Lucia), 320-331 
(Vanessa). They further claimed that there had been a conspiracy involving 
McDermeit, Hendricksen, Sutherland, Officer Straddling, and several other 
unidentified Dillard's employees who assisted in the investigation, and possibly 
Officer Partridge as well. See generally id. Defendants testified that the conspiracy 
appeared to be the result of racial animus. R. 243: 292,294. They also claimed that 
during the encounter in the office, Straddling had slapped Vanessa across the face, 
thrown her to the ground without provocation, and put his hands down her pants 
and fondled her vagina. R. 243: 298, 325-26, 331. 
On cross-examination, the State focused on the scope of the alleged 
conspiracy, arguing that the sheer number of people involved made it implausible. 
See, e.g., R. 243:301-04,314. The State also showed that the allegations were at odds 
with the Defendants' subsequent behavior. For example, the State pointed out that 
Vanessa never filed charges against Officer Straddling for the alleged abuse, and 
that neither woman had complained to Dillard's about the alleged conduct of its 
employees. R. 243: 315-16. Moreover, although both women had claimed that 
Vanessa had needed 46 minutes in the dressing room because physical disabilities 
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made it hard for her to move, the security camera footage showed her walking 
around without any physical restriction that evening. R. 243: 330. 
Although the prosecutor questioned the validity of the claimed conspiracy, he 
never mentioned Skip Curtis or the prior claims regarding his alleged involvement 
in the alleged conspiracy. See generally R. 243:300-317 (cross-examination of Lucia), 
328-34 (cross-examination of Vanessa). 
After trial, a new judge suggests that the prosecutor might have opened the 
door for testimony about the Skip Curtis allegation 
The jury convicted both Defendants. R. 243: 383. After trial, Defendants 
moved to set aside the verdicts. R. 346:174-81; R. 347:186-76. Defendants raised 
several claims, including that the prosecutor had opened the door their claims about 
Skip Curtis by "repeatedly ask[ing], "Why would the store personnel want to hurt 
you." R. 346 at 175. Defendants offered no record citation for this alleged question. 
In the interim, the case had been transferred from Judge Stott to Judge David 
Mortenson. On August 19, 2009, Judge Mortensen issued an order denying 
Defendant's claims. R. 197-202. With respect to the Skip Curtis issue, Judge 
Mortensen agreed that the prosecutor had "opened the door" for that testimony by 
asking " [W]hy would store personnel want to hurt you?" R. 346 at 197. But Judge 
Mortensen concluded that because defense counsel had not asked Judge Stott for a 
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"release[ ] from the earlier order/' there was no basis to overturn the verdict. R. 346 
at 197. Judge Mortensen then gave the Defendants probation. R. 242:12,16. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Defendants argue that their trial counsel performed deficiently by not arguing 
that the prosecutor had opened the door for testimony about the Skip Curtis lawsuit 
during his cross-examinations of them. This claim fails for two reasons. 
First, Defendants have not shown deficient performance. As an initial matter, 
the claim is inadequately briefed. Defendants do not identify the questions that they 
believe opened the door for this testimony, nor do they support their claim with any 
authority showing that the motion would have been successful. But more 
importantly, Defendant's claim also fails because defense counsel had a legitimate 
strategic basis for not making the motion mid-trial. Specifically, the prosecutor had 
already explained that if Defendants made this claim, the prosecutor had physical 
evidence that would have shown that Vanessa was lying about Curtis' whereabouts 
on the day in question. Thus, defense counsel's decision to not raise this issue was 
presumptively motivated by a desire to keep this damaging evidence out. 
Second, Defendants have failed to show that they were prejudiced by the 
alleged deficient performance. Although Defendants now claim that the conspiracy 
against them was motivated by the Skip Curtis lawsuit, they have presented no 
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evidence establishing any connection between Curtis and this criminal 
investigation. Moreover, the case against them at trial was based on testimony from 
five different witnesses, as well as surveillance video that corroborated their claims. 
Given this, there is no probability, let alone a reasonable probability, that the result 
would have been any different if Defendants had been allowed to offer this 
testimony. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
TRIAL COUNSEL WAS NOT INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO 
ASK THE TRIAL COURT TO REVISIT ITS RULING EXCLUDING 
TESTIMONY ABOUT THE CURTIS LAWSUIT 
Defendants claim that the prosecutor " opened the door to evidence of the 
Skip Curtis lawsuit" during his cross-examinations of them. Aplt. Br. 12. They 
accordingly argue that trial counsel was ineffective for not "seek[ing] release from 
the Court's order excluding evidence relating to Skip Curtis/' Aplt. Br. 11-15. But 
Defendants have not met their burden of demonstrating deficient performance, 
because the record shows that there were legitimate strategic reasons for this 
decision. And Defendants have also failed to carry their burden of establishing 
prejudice, given the overwhelming evidence of guilt that was presented at trial. 
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A. Background law. 
To establish ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendants must satisfy the two-
part test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
First, Defendants must show that trial counsel's performance was deficient by 
identifying specific acts or omissions that fall outside reasonable professional 
judgment. Id. at 687-88, 690. An appellate court "must indulge a strong 
presumption that counsel's conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable 
professional assistance; that is, the defendant must overcome the presumption that, 
under the circumstances, the challenged action 'might be considered sound trial 
strategy.'" Id. at 689 (citation omitted). Defendants can prevail only by showing 
that "counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the counsel 
guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 
770,787 (2011) (quotations and citation omitted). Defendants must prove that there 
is no conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel's actions. See State v. Clark, 2004 UT 
25, f 7, 89 P.3d 162; State v. Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, | 58, 61 P.3d 291. 
Second, Defendants must show that "there is a reasonable probability that, 
but for counsel[s]' unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have 
been different." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; see also State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 
1 19, 12 P.3d 92; State v. Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998). "A reasonable 
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probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. It is 
not enough to show that the errors had some conceivable effect on the outcome of 
the proceeding. Counsel's errors must be so serious as to deprive the defendant of a 
fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable/' Harrington, 131 S.Ct. at 787-88 (quotations 
and citation omitted). "Because some errors will have had a pervasive effect on the 
inferences to be drawn from the evidence, altering the entire evidentiary picture, 
and some will have had an isolated trivial effect, in determining the effect of the 
error, we 'consider the totality of the evidence before the . . . jury." State v. Hales, 
2007 UT 14,1 86,152 P.3d 321 (quotations and citation omitted). 
When raising an ineffective assistance claim, Defendants bear the burden of 
assuring that "the record is adequate." Litherland, 2000 UT 76,116. As a result, "an 
appellate court will presume that any argument of ineffectiveness presented to it is 
supported by all the relevant evidence of which [the] defendant is aware." Id. at 
Tf 17. "Where the record appears inadequate in any fashion, ambiguities or 
deficiencies resulting therefrom simply will be construed in favor of a finding that 
counsel performed effectively." Id. Defendant's proof of prejudice must be based on 
a "demonstrable reality and not a speculative matter." Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50 
(quotations and citation omitted). 
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B, Defendants have not shown that their counsel performed 
deficiently. 
As noted, Defendants claim that trial counsel performed deficiently by failing 
to seek a "release from the trial court's order" preventing them from testifying about 
the Skip Curtis lawsuit. Aplt. Br. 10-13. Defendants have not met their burden for 
two reasons. 
First, they have not adequately briefed this claim. The rules of appellate 
procedure require a party to set forth the "contentions and reasons... with respect 
to the issues presented, including the grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved 
in the trial court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record 
relied on/' Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9). "An argument that does not contain 'reasoned 
analysis based upon relevant legal authority' is inadequately briefed and we will 
not consider the issue." State v. Sloan, 2003 UT App 170, If 15 n.l, 72 R3d 138 
(citation omitted). 
Here, Defendants claim that the prosecutor opened the door for the trial court 
to reconsider its pretrial ruling excluding testimony about the Curtis lawsuit. But 
the Argument section of Defendants7 brief cites no place in the record where the 
prosecutor allegedly opened the door for this evidence, let alone identify any 
particular question that did. See Aplt. Br. 10-13. Instead, Defendants only attempt 
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to articulate how this occurred in a single sentence in their Statement of the Case, 
alleging that the State had "focused on the apparent lack of a motive for the 
conspiracy" by "posing questions such as 'Mr. Hendrickson, he really wants to hurt 
you, doesn't he?'" Aplt. Br. 5. This does not satisfy rule 24(a)(9), which requires a 
party to adequately brief its contentions within the Argument section. Id. 
Defendants also cite no legal authority — from Utah or elsewhere — setting 
forth the standards by which a party "opens the door" for admission of evidence 
that had already been excluded. See Aplt. Br. 10-13. This, too, violates rule 24(a)(9), 
which requires "development" and "reasoned analysis" of authority that supports a 
party's position. State v. Tliomas, 961 P.2d 299, 305 (Utah 1998). Here, Defendants 
have not even attempted to show how the unidentified questions opened the door 
for testimony of the Curtis suit, a necessary predicate for showing that counsel was 
deficient for not raising the motion. Thus, Defendants have inadequately briefed 
their claim. 
Second, even if Defendants had adequately briefed this claim, it still fails 
because Defendants have not rebutted the presumption that their counsel had a 
legitimate reason for not making this motion. 
As noted in Defendants' brief, Lucia and Vanessa would have claimed that 
Hendricksen referred to Vanessa as "the individual that sued Skip Curtis" while at 
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the Dillard's office. Aplt. Br. 4. Defendants also claim that Vanessa would have 
testified that Officer Straddling had pulled over en route to the jail, whereupon 
Curtis ''opened the door of Straddling's patrol car, put a gun" to Vanessa's head, 
and "instructed her to terminate the lawsuit against him." Aplt. Br. 4. 
When the issue was raised on the first day of trial, however, the prosecutor 
said that he had documentary evidence that would have disproven this claim. 
Specifically, the prosecutor had passport stamps, airline tickets, and photographs 
proving that Skip Curtis could not have threatened Vanessa that day because he 
was actually in Amman, Jordan. R. 244: 8. 
Given this, defense counsel had a reasonable basis for not attempting to raise 
this issue again at trial—specifically, to avoid having Vanessa offer testimony that 
could be proven false. While credibility is always an important issue, it was 
particularly important here given the nature of the defense. As discussed above, the 
State's case was supported by the testimony of five witnesses. To prevail, 
Defendants had to convince the jury that the State's witnesses were not telling the 
truth. But the encounter in the manager's office was not recorded, and Defendants 
had no other extrinsic proof that the State's witnesses were lying. Thus, their 
defense ultimately hinged on their own personal credibility. They had to convince 
the jury that they were telling the truth and that the State's witnesses were not. 
17 
In this context, defense counsel's mid-trial decision to not try to reintroduce 
Defendants' claims about Skip Curtis appears to have been eminently reasonable. If 
) 
counsel had successfully made this motion, the State would have then been allowed 
to officer extrinsic evidence showing that Vanessa was lying about Skip Curtis being 
in Orem that day, thereby fatally damaging the Defendants' credibility-based 
defense. 
As noted above, Defendants can only prevail by proving that that there was 
no conceivable tactical basis for trial counsel's actions. See Clark, 2004 UT 25, f 7; 
Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, % 58. Preserving a defendant's credibility in a credibility-
based defense is a perfectly reasonable trial strategy. Defendant's deficient 
performance claim thus fails. 
C Defendants also have not shown that they were prejudiced by the 
alleged deficient performance. 
As noted, Defendants must also show that, absent counsel's acts or omissions, 
there is a reasonable probability of a more favorable result. Chacon, 962 P.2d at 50. 
Defendants have not shown this here. 
As an initial matter, Defendants have not offered any proof that the alleged 
conspiracy was actually motivated by the Curtis lawsuit. At the preliminary 
hearing, for example, Hendricksen testified that he knew Curtis, but declined to 
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describe him as a "friend." R. 255: 21. More importantly, Hendricksen and Officer 
Straddling both denied that Curtis had anything to do with this case. R. 255: 72-73. 
Defendants point to no evidence contradicting this — specifically, they point 
to no evidence showing that Hendricksen, Straddling, or anyone else involved in 
this case was so close to Curtis that they would have been motivated to orchestrate a 
criminal conspiracy on his behalf. And they also point to no evidence showing that 
Curtis or anybody else had any need to violently threaten them. As explained by 
the prosecutor, Vanessa's suit against Curtis was several years old, and Curtis had 
already won at trial at the time of this alleged incident. R. 346 at 128. Thus, he 
would have had little reason to orchestrate a broad criminal conspiracy to stop 
Vanessa from pursuing an appeal of a case that he had already won. 
But more importantly, Defendants' claim fails because even if they had been 
allowed to testify about the Curtis lawsuit, there is no reasonable probability that 
this testimony would have changed the result of the criminal trial. As noted, courts 
"consider the totality of the evidence before the . . . jury" when assessing a claim of 
prejudice. Hales, 2007 UT 14, If 86. 
Here, Lucia and Vanessa could have testified about their suspicions that 
Curtis had been involved, and Vanessa could have testified about her claim that 
Curtis had physically threatened her en route to the jail. But the State would have 
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then offered sworn testimony from Hendricksen and Officer Straddling that Curtis 
was not involved, as well as documentary proof showing that he could not have 
threatened Vanessa that day because he was in Amman, Jordan. R. 244: 8. As 
discussed above, this would have seriously undercut Vanessa's credibility, which 
was necessarily a critical component of Defendants' credibility-based defense. 
Moreover, the State also still had overwhelming evidence showing that 
Defendants committed retail theft. Defendants were caught on a security camera 
carrying shopping bags into Dillard's, loading their arms up with clothing, and then 
taking it to a dressing room. See R. 244:101-03; State's Exh. 1 at 7:54:44. The security 
camera footage showed that Vanessa remained in the dressing room for 46 minutes 
without leaving, and that in the interim, Lucia repeatedly came out, grabbed more 
clothes, and took them to Vanessa in the dressing room. R. 244:103; see also State's 
Exh. 1 at 8:31:35, 8:35:40, 8:36:58, 8:38:14. The footage also showed that when the 
two emerged 46 minutes later, they left without any merchandise, but with 
noticeably heavier bags. R. 244:105,125,135; State's Exh. 1 at 7:54:44 to 8:40:01. 
In addition to the uncontested video evidence, several witnesses testified 
about their personal observations of Defendants' retail theft. The encounter in the 
manager's office was described by Hendricksen, Sutherland, McDermeit, and 
Straddling. R. 243: 234-42; 244:129-30,167-77,199-211, Partridge, Straddling, and 
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Hendricksen also testified about similar stacks of rolled up clothing that were in 
Defendants7 car. R. 243: 243,265; 244:178. 
Defendants' only response at trial was to offer their own contrary version of 
the events. They claimed that they never put anything in their bags, and that this 
large group of people were all engaged in a conspiracy to frame them. 
Although the jury heard this account, it did not believe it. There is no 
probability, let alone a reasonable probability, that the jury would have changed its 
mind if the Defendants had also been able to testify, without corroboration, that 
they had unsuccessfully sued a police officer several years earlier, where that officer 
worked for a different police agency, was not involved in this investigation, was 
apparently unconnected to anyone involved in this investigation, and was on the 
other side of the world when this crime occurred. 
In short, Defendants' speculative claim is unsupported by any proof, and its 
potential impact on this case was, at most, tenuous. Defendants have not shown 
prejudice, and their ineffective assistance claim must accordingly be denied. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the Court should affirm Defendants' convictions. 
Respectfully submitted March H , 2011. 
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